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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
Information disclosure can help to overcome problems associated with asymmetric 
information.  For example, Lewis (2011) argues that sellers with high-quality products will 
reveal more detailed information about their products, allowing them to charge higher 
prices. Using data from eBay marketplace, I empirically study the effect of information 
disclosure in mitigating asymmetric information.  I find that auctions generally sell for a 
higher price when sellers disclose more information, and this effect appears stronger when 
the quality level of the product is more uncertain.  However, when other quality assurance 
mechanisms are available, sellers may not rely on information disclosure purely as a signal 
quality.  I find that some experienced eBay sellers maintain a strong reputation by 
disclosing more information when selling items of lower quality.   
Chapter 2 
Reputation mechanism is used by the marketplace to mitigate the asymmetric 
information problem. Using a unique dataset from eBay, this study explores the role of the 
bidder’s experience in evaluating the seller’s reputation measures of feedback score and 
Top Rated Plus badge (TRP). The results found that the bidders’ evaluation of the sellers’ 
reputation measures vary with former’s level of experience. The findings indicate that 
 iii 
feedback scores provide more value when bidders have experience with the eBay feedback 
system while TRP provides more value for inexperienced bidders. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
The Effect of Information Disclosure on eBay 
 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Markets in which buyers are unable to observe product quality ex-ante experience 
an asymmetric information problem, potentially leading to market failure (Akerlof, 1970). 
Sellers can reduce this problem by voluntarily disclosing details supporting the quality of 
their items for sale (Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981, Jovanovic, 1982). Because doing so 
suggests the information about the product is favorable, buyers interpret not disclosing this 
information as a signal of poor quality. For this reason, sellers who wish to sell an item 
with a quality higher than a certain threshold should choose to disclose such information.   
In this paper, I investigate the role of information disclosure in mitigating the 
problem of information asymmetry in online markets, for example eBay and Amazon, 
among others. These markets face this issue because buyers usually have no previous trade 
experience with sellers, and they are not able to verify the quality of item until it is 
delivered, a problem that could be reduced through information disclosure. To apply this 
mechanism in online markets, Lewis (2011) argues first, that buyers need to be able to 
verify the information disclosed ex-post and second, that is its accuracy should be 
enforceable. If these two conditions are satisfied, then the information disclosed is 
considered to be a contract between the buyer and the seller. The information in such a 
contract helps buyers update their assessment of the quality of the product, and sellers with 
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high-quality products have an incentive to reveal detailed information about their products, 
while sellers with low-quality products would reveal less information. Thus, the amount of 
information about the quality of goods plays a role in determining the auction end price of 
an item.  
This paper investigates the effect of information disclosure on the outcomes of 
eBay’s auctions by initially using Lewis’ (2011) model. I examine the effect of the amount 
of information disclosed, based on the photos and text posted by sellers on the auction 
webpage, on the auction price. I then extend Lewis’ (2011) model to account for the levels 
of uncertainty regarding the goods. I argue that the amount of information disclosed by 
sellers should be a function of the level of uncertainty. Finally, I examine the effect of 
information disclosure when two other forms of quality assurance, specifically a return 
policy and certification, are used by the seller. For this study, I collected eight months’ 
worth of data on iPhone 6 auctions from eBay, a dataset containing approximately 37,568 
observations. For this research, observations are defined as the auctions for which I was 
able to collect the final price of the items sold as well as the characteristics of the auction, 
the seller, and the item. The primary variables of interest related to the amount of 
information disclosed include the number of photos and the amount of the text measured 
by the file size in bytes and the number of words.  
This paper comprises three parts. First, I test the relationship between the amount 
of information disclosed and the auction end price, hypothesizing that the quantity of 
information correlates with the buyers’ willingness to pay. The results from the series of 
hedonic regressions run on the data show that the number of photos is significantly 
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correlated with the price, suggesting that higher quality iPhones are associated with more 
information and that, thus, the price is higher. 
Second, I claim that the return on the amount of information disclosed should vary 
with the level of uncertainty regarding the quality of the goods. In other words, to mitigate 
the problem of information asymmetry, an item with a low level of uncertainty requires 
less information about it to be disclosed than does an item with a high level of uncertainty. 
The prediction of the information disclosure’s model—that providing more information is 
correlated with quality—is true up to a certain point. However, providing more information 
in the case of a low level of uncertainty about an item may not improve the bidder’s 
assessment, meaning the cost of providing information in this case is higher than the benefit 
of doing so. Cost is defined here as the time required to take photos or write a description 
and upload this information to the webpage. Thus, the amount of information disclosed 
should be a function of the level of uncertainty because as the level of uncertainty increases 
so does the return on the information disclosed. The results from this study demonstrate 
that the value of information disclosure varies with the level of uncertainty up to a certain 
point. In addition, they also show that the type of information disclosed—the number of 
photos and the file size in terms of bytes and number of words—used by sellers varies with 
the level of uncertainty. The text description is significant when the level of uncertainty is 
either very high or very low, while when the level of uncertainty is in the middle of the 
range, the number of photos is more effective in revealing the quality of the item.  
Finally, in the third section, I investigate the value of information disclosure when 
one of the two other quality assurance mechanisms is used by the seller, specifically 
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certification and returns, hypothesizing that as the quality assurance mechanism reduces 
the asymmetrical information problem, the information disclosure premium should 
decline. A high-performance seller is certified by eBay as a Top Rated Plus (TRP), a 
certificate that signals to buyers the quality of the quality of the seller’s good. I examine 
the return from disclosing information for TRP sellers, the results showing that the amount 
of information disclosed is negatively correlated with the auction price: as the amount of 
information disclosed increases, the auction price decreases. These results contradict the 
prediction of Lewis’s (2011) model that sellers reveal only favorable information, meaning 
a seller with high-quality goods would reveal more information than a seller with low-
quality goods. However, the results found in this study suggest that TRP sellers disclose 
unfavorable information, which leads to a lower price. The reason for this behavior is that 
the long-term gain from revealing information, even though it is unfavorable, is larger than 
the short-term gain from not doing so. In addition to reducing information asymmetry, TRP 
sellers enjoy benefits that include lower fees for selling on eBay and a better location in 
search results. Therefore, in the case of TRP sellers, the long-term profit gained from 
accurately describing the items is larger than the short-term profit from misrepresenting 
them. Misrepresenting items by withholding unfavorable information puts sellers at risk of 
losing their TRP badges since the accuracy of the description is one criterion for awarding 
them. Another explanation is provided by Tadelis and Zettelmeyer (2015), who argue that 
information disclosure helps to match buyers and sellers, leading to improved market 
outcomes, a result that holds despite whether the information is good or bad.  
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Non-TRP sellers can use return policies as a quality assurance mechanism to reduce 
information asymmetry. These policies function as a form of insurance because buyers can 
verify the quality of items ex-post, and those dissatisfied with their purchases can return 
them for a refund. Therefore, with a return policy, the value of information disclosure 
should be lower. However, the results from this research show that returning an item does 
not affect the value of information disclosure. In other words, buyers do not value returns 
offered by non-TRP sellers, perhaps because buyers are uncertain about being reimbursed, 
especially by sellers who do not have a strong reputation and, thus, may not fulfill their 
promise of reimbursement. An alternative explanation is that buyers see the return process 
as a complicated, time-consuming one that requires some knowledge of the eBay policy on 
filing returns and of the rules for sellers. The findings suggest that such a policy does not 
have an impact and reduces the premium earned from information disclosure.  
This study joins the growing body of literature on the effects of information 
disclosure. First, I show that voluntary disclosure helps to reduce the information 
asymmetry problem and that sellers with high-quality items reveal favorable information. 
Mathios (2000) conducted a similar study investigating the effect of nutrition labels in the 
salad market before and after the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, the results showing 
that approximately half of the firms voluntarily disclosed such information before it was 
nationally mandatory. Most of these firms were those with relatively high-quality products 
(e.g. low sodium, few calories). These results are similar to mine that suggest sellers with 
high-quality goods voluntarily reveal favorable information and that sellers with low-
quality goods do not. Jin and Leslie (2003) also found that voluntary disclosure improves 
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market outcomes. Their results indicate that in Los Angeles, the majority of restaurants 
chose to voluntarily reveal their hygiene quality, a practice that leads to substantial 
improvement in the quality of restaurant cleanliness.   
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides background about eBay while 
Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 provides the theoretical framework and Section 5 
presents the results of the empirical tests. Section 6 concludes with a summary of this study. 
1.2. eBay Background  
On eBay, sellers can list items using one of two sales mechanisms, “Auction” or 
“Buy It Now,” with sellers having the option to add a "Make Offer" to either of these two. 
In this paper, I focus on auctions as they offer the ability to more clearly ascertain the 
buyers’ willingness to pay. When sellers select the auction mechanism, they input the 
starting price and shipping cost and choose whether to have a reserve price in addition to 
specifying the duration of the auction, selecting 1, 3, 5, 7, or 10 days. Once the auction 
starts, sellers cannot change its specified duration. When sellers create this listing page, 
they need to add information about the item, some of which is mandatory, including 
category, model and condition, among other details. In the description section, sellers can 
voluntarily add more information about the quality of the item, either as text or photos they 
upload.   
Once the auction ends, the winning bidder pays the second-highest bid plus a small 
increment. The seller then sends the item to the winning bidder. After receiving the item, 
the buyer verifies both the item’s condition and the seller’s statement. Then the buyer can 
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leave +1, 0, or –1 as feedback while the seller is only allowed to provide positive feedback. 
Information from all previous feedback is available on the user’s profile.  
1.3. Data  
I collected data from eBay on iPhone 6 auctions over an eight-month period. The 
iPhone was selected to ensure an adequate number of observations as it is one of the most 
popular items on eBay and of all iPhone generations, the iPhone 6 was the most popular 
during the data collection period. Another reason for selecting the iPhone is that I wanted 
to use a homogenous good that varies in terms of its condition. An item with these 
characteristics allows for accurate testing of the effect of information disclosure on price.  
To collect data from eBay, I wrote a program using R to download the auction 
webpages, which were then scraped to collect the variables of interest--the starting bid, 
winning bid, shipping cost, number of photos, text size, seller characteristics, and item 
characteristics.1 Figure 1.1 shows the webpage for the iPhone 6 listing on eBay with the 
information of interest highlighted. Figure 1.2 shows the seller’s description and Figure 1.3 
shows the photos of listed iPhone. I then excluded the outliers, that is, those observations 
with an auction end price higher than $500 and observations for which the downloaded 
webpage file was unreadable. In the end, I obtained 37,568 observations, i.e., auctions.  
Table 1.1 lists the summary statistics. The variable Final Price is the auction end 
price (the winning bid plus the shipping cost) in U.S. dollars. For the Starting Price (the 
 
1 In some cases, sellers fail to provide information about their items’ characteristics on the listing webpages 
or they misallocate the information. Both make it difficult to scrape the webpage for the variables of interest. 
Thus, I had to write different versions of the scraping program to account for these variations. I was able to 
recover the appropriate information most of the time.  
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starting bid plus the shipping cost) in U.S. dollars, I was unable to obtain information about 
the shipping cost in some cases; for these I used the mean of the shipping cost. On average, 
the final price of the iPhone 6 was $149, and the starting price was approximately $82. 
Reserve is the variable indicating whether a seller has set up a reserve price and 
whether the reserve price was met. Approximately 0.02 percent of the auctions in my data 
had a reserve price. Even though in the dataset for this study setting a reserve price was not 
a common practice among sellers, the starting price can be seen as a form of reserve price—
and it is relatively high. Most of the sellers who set high starting prices are individual 
sellers. Approximately 68 percent of the auctions were listed by individuals and about 32 
percent by dealers who had at least two listings during the sample periods.  
Sold is a dummy variable that equals one if the iPhone is sold and zero otherwise. 
Approximately 90 percent of the auctioned iPhones in the dataset were sold. To account 
for relisted items, I used the dummy variable Relist, which equaled one if the iPhone had 
previously been listed during the sample period and zero otherwise. Another variable that 
might affect the outcome of an auction is duration. The longer an auction stays on eBay, 
the higher the chance of many bidders noticing it and bidding. Therefore, I included the 
variable Auction Duration. On average, the duration of an auction was approximately five 
days. The day on which an auction ends might affect the ending price. For example, one 
would expect that auctions ending on a Sunday might have higher end prices than those 
ending on other days of the week. Thus, I used Sunday as a dummy variable that equals 
one if the auction ends on Sunday and zero otherwise. The data show that approximately 
20 percent of the auctions ended on a Sunday. 
 
 
9 
 
 
 
 
Most important to the research reported here, the amount of information provided 
by sellers is measured by the variables the number of photos and the length of the text, 
which is measured by both file size and number of words. In the dataset, sellers used on 
average five photos in the listing and approximately (file size) and 132 words to describe 
the item. 
1.4. Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework used in this paper is similar to the one Lewis (2011) 
used in his study of the eBay Motors market. He argues that sellers are able to reduce the 
problem of information asymmetry in online markets by disclosing private information 
about their products. This information disclosure causes bidders to update their 
assessments of the products’ quality and increase their bids. In this section, I briefly explain 
the theoretical effect of information disclosure on reducing the information asymmetry, 
followed by a discussion of Lewis’s (2011) model of information disclosure in the online 
market. I then extend the model. First, I account for the level of uncertainty about product 
quality and show that the importance of information disclosure varies according the level 
of uncertainty. Finally, I show that using an additional quality assurance mechanism, either 
a certificate or warranty, reduces the value of information disclosure.  
1.4.1. Information Disclosure and Prices 
In a setting in which sellers have private information about their products, the 
market experiences information asymmetry, which may lead to market failure (Akerlof, 
1970). By revealing this information, the seller can reduce this problem, thereby improving 
market outcome (Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981; Jovanovic, 1982). The reasoning here 
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is the following: the bidder’s willingness to pay increases as the quality of the good 
increases. However, bidders are not able to fully ascertain the quality in this market; thus 
they bid based on the average quality. The seller with the good of the highest quality reveals 
this information to separate herself from those with goods of a lower quality. The bidders 
who now know the actual quality of the good bid higher. The seller with the second highest 
quality also reveals his information, also separating herself from sellers with lower quality 
goods. This process of revelation continues among sellers until the point is reached where 
the quality of a good is lower than the average quality. These sellers do not reveal the 
quality of their goods; this lack of information is subsequently interpreted by the bidder as 
a signal of bad quality.  
To answer the question of how a market like eBay Motors addresses the problem 
of asymmetric information, Lewis (2011) extends the theories of revealing to fit the online 
market. He argues that in online auctions, sellers use texts and photos to describe the quality 
of their items on the listing webpages. These descriptions can be seen as a contract between 
the buyer and the seller. This contract helps to reduce the problem of asymmetric 
information because bidders use the information in this contract to update their prior beliefs 
about the quality of an item and bid accordingly. However, the description needs to satisfy 
two conditions for buyers to consider it a contract and for it to affect the outcome of the 
auction. First, the buyers must be able to verify the information provided by the seller ex-
post; otherwise, they will consider the seller’s statement to be cheap talk. An example of 
such verifiable information is a statement saying that the iPhone has no scratches. In this 
case, the buyer can easily verify this information once the iPhone has been received. On 
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the other hand, some information might not be as easy to verify, such as the lifespan of the 
phone’s battery.2  
The second condition is that the seller’s statement must be enforceable; otherwise, 
it has no meaning to the buyers.3 In 2011, eBay.com introduced a buyer protection policy, 
referred to as the “eBay Money Back Guarantee,” which acts as an insurance policy for 
buyers in case of fraud.  If the buyer does not receive the item or if the item differs from 
the seller’s description, eBay promises the buyer a full refund.4 Thus, the seller has no 
incentive to misrepresent his item. Sellers know that if they provide information that can 
be enforced and verified, then buyers will update their beliefs based on this information 
and bid accordingly. Thus, sellers have the incentive to disclose favorable information.  
In summary, sellers of high-quality goods provide detailed information on listing 
webpages, while sellers with low-quality goods provide less detailed information. Buyers 
interpret the amount of information the seller provides as a signal of the good’s 
unobservable quality. Therefore, the quantity of information provided affects buyers’ 
willingness to pay. This analysis leads to the first hypothesis investigated in this study:  
Hypothesis 1: The amount of information revealed on the auction webpage is positively 
correlated with price.  
 
2 Battery lifespan is the lifetime of battery until it no long holds a charge. The chemical age of the battery is 
affected by such factors as the number of times it has been recharged, how the iPhone was stored, and various 
environmental factors like temperature and exposure to the sun. Verifying the lifespan of an iPhone’s battery 
is not an easy task. 
3 Lewis (2011) claims that the enforceable criterion is satisfied in eBay-Motors since most buyers pick up the car in 
person. Moreover, in the case when the buyer chooses the shipping option, the payment is held by a third party until 
the vehicle is delivered and the buyer verifies its condition. 
4 For more details about “Money Back Guarantee” policy see Appendix A. 
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1.4.2. Information Disclosure and Level of Uncertainty  
In the previous subsection, I explained Lewis’s (2011) model, which states that the 
amount of information disclosed by a seller on eBay has a significant impact on the auction 
price in the online market. In this subsection, I extend his model by accounting for the level 
of uncertainty, arguing that the return on information disclosure varies with the level of 
uncertainty regarding the good’s quality. The amount of information that needs to be 
disclosed in the case of an item with a low level of uncertainty is substantially less than for 
one with a high level of uncertainty. Providing more information in the case of the former 
would not improve the bidder’s assessment. In such a case, the benefit of providing more 
information is lower than the cost. Thus, the amount of information disclosed should be a 
function of the level of uncertainty.  
eBay includes the following six levels of uncertainty, listed from high to low: For 
Parts or Not Working, Used, Seller Refurbished, Manufacturer Refurbished, NewOther, 
and New.5 The expectation is that as the level of uncertainty increases, the return on 
information disclosure increases as well. For example, for a new iPhone, sellers may show 
a photo of sealed packaging and provide a short description of the product’s quality. 
Providing more information for this level of uncertainty does not increase the benefit to the 
 
5 eBay defines the levels of uncertainty as the following; New is a brand-new item that has never been used 
and in sealed packaging, while NewOther is a new item with no signs of wear or maybe a new item with the 
original packaging open. For Manufacturer Refurbished, the manufacturer certifies the item is in excellent 
condition, while for Seller Refurbished, the seller or a third party certifies that the item is a working item and 
in excellent condition. A Used item may have some signs of wear and tear but is in working condition. For 
Parts or Not Working indicates an item that is not functional; it could be defective or locked so that it cannot 
be activated. (source: https://www.ebay.com/pages/help/sell/contextual/condition_1.html) 
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seller. On the other hand, an iPhone with the second lowest level of condition NewOther 
may be one that is new but in an open box, that is unused but has some defects or that is 
slightly used. It is obvious that the level of uncertainty here is higher than in the case of a 
new iPhone. Therefore, these sellers need to disclose more information to show the quality 
of their items. In the dataset, on average a new iPhone was listed with three photos and 
56.97 words while a NewOther iPhone on average had four photos and 104.06 words. This 
analysis leads to the second hypothesis examined in this study:  
Hypothesis 2: The return on information disclosure varies with the level of 
uncertainty. 
1.4.3. Information Disclosure and Alternative Quality Assurances 
This subsection focuses on an analysis of the return on information disclosure when 
sellers use a different quality assurance mechanism. In addition to information disclosure, 
sellers may use alternative mechanisms to mitigate the problem of asymmetric information, 
for example certification and warranty (return). The question here is how the use of one of 
these alternative quality assurances affects the return on information disclosure.  
eBay’s Top Rated Plus (TRP) certification, one mechanism of quality assurance, is 
awarded to sellers based on their previous activity in terms of feedback ratings and the 
amount of the trade. This certification gives bidders some indication of the sellers’ quality, 
thus reducing the asymmetric information problem. On the other hand, return is a 
mechanism that can be used by non-TRP sellers to reduce the problem as it allows 
dissatisfied buyers to return an item within a specified time period for a full refund. In some 
cases, sellers might charge restocking fees. This return mechanism functions like an 
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insurance policy for unhappy buyers.6 Therefore, both sellers with an TRP certification or 
those without it but who offer a return policy reduce the problem of asymmetric 
information. As a result, the alternative quality assurance reduces the premium on the 
amount of information disclosed. This analysis leads to an extension of Lewis’(2011) 
model and the third hypothesis investigated in this study: 
Hypothesis 3: The impact of information disclosure is lower when an alternative 
quality assurance mechanism is in place.  
1.5. Econometric Specification and Results  
This section includes an in-depth empirical investigation of the relationship 
between information disclosure and the end price of iPhone 6 auctions on eBay. First, I test 
Hypothesis One by examining the average effect of information disclosure on increasing 
the auction end price, then Hypothesis Two by examining the effect of information 
disclosure on items with different levels of uncertainty. Finally, I test Hypothesis Three by 
exploring the effect of information disclosure when an alternative quality assurance 
mechanism is in place.  
1.5.1. Information Disclosure and Prices 
As explained in Section 4, sellers disclose the information they have about a 
product to mitigate the asymmetric information problem between sellers and buyers, with 
sellers of high quality goods providing detailed information about their items and those 
 
6 Return is different from the Money Back Guarantee policy that eBay offers for buyers. The Money Back 
Guarantee covers buyers in cases when the item’s description is different from the actual item or the item 
was not delivered, while with return policies allow them to return an item for any reason. 
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with low-quality item, less. Thus, the amount of information provided is interpreted by 
buyers as a signal of an item’s quality, meaning the amount of information should correlate 
with the auction price. Following Lewis (2011), I use the hedonic regression below to 
estimate the relationship between information disclosure and price: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑝  𝛽  𝑃ℎ𝑜𝑡𝑜  𝛽 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘  𝛽  𝑁𝑒𝑔  𝛽  𝐴𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
                    𝛽 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒   𝛽  𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝜀                                           (1.1)  
 
Here log Pi represents the logarithm of the second-highest bid plus the shipping 
cost. To measure the amount of information, I use the number of photos and the amount of 
text. I include the variable Photo, the number of photos that the seller posts on the listing’s 
webpage, and the variable Text Size, measured using two methods,  the number of words 
in the description and the log of the file size of the seller’s description, defined here as the 
description section of the webpage measured in bytes. The expectation is that the 
coefficients for both Photo and Text Size are positive.  
Following previous studies, I use a feedback score and the percentage of negative 
feedback over the previous twelve months to capture the seller’s reputation. Another factor 
that might affect the price is the Auction Duration, the number of days the auction is active 
on eBay because as the auction duration increases, the price also increases. The longer the 
auction, the higher the chance of bidders realizing it and participating. Log Starting Price 
is the logarithm of the starting price plus the shipping cost. As indicated previously, the 
starting price can be seen as the reserve price. Thus, a higher starting price should 
discourage buyers from participating in the auction. I then add the conditions, memory size, 
and unlocked status, as fixed effects. Since the data collected covers eight months, I use 
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the week as a fixed effect to capture trends in demand over time; εi is an error term, with 
the assumption that it uncorrelated with the independent variables; then I relax this 
assumption in Appendix B. 
Table 1.2 reports the results of the different specifications. The first specification 
includes only Photo as a measurement of the amount of information. In the second, the file 
size as a measurement of Text Size is added, and in the last specification, I use the number 
of words as a measurement of text size. As the results show, the coefficients generally have 
the expected sign. However, only the coefficients for Photo are significant.7 
These results confirm Lewis’s (2011) findings that the number of photos positively 
correlates with the auction’s end price. However, the results from this study indicate that 
the effect of photos is lower than in Lewis (2011). Adding one more photo of an iPhone 6 
would increase the price by 0.4 percent, which, for the average iPhone in the dataset, 
amounts to approximately $0.6. In Lewis (2011), increasing the number of photos of a car 
from nine to ten would increase the price by 1.5 percent.8 The smaller effect of photos 
found here might be due to the nature of the item. The iPhone 6 is a relatively homogenous 
good, while cars are heterogeneous with a high level of uncertainty about their quality.9 
 
7 I use additional specifications that are not reported here. All of these specifications show the same result.   
8 In Lewis (2011) the marginal return for photos is diminishing. 
9The probability of sale in my dataset is approximately 90.4 percent while in Lewis (2011), it is approximately 
28.4 percent. This difference is due to the more extensive use of the reserve price by sellers in the automobile 
market than in the iPhone market. It might be the seller who fails to sell his cars on eBay has better outside 
options while with the iPhone the option of selling elsewhere is not as available. Thus, what might drive the 
return of photos in the case of the automobile market comes from the seller’s ability to be patient and wait 
for the right buyer willing to pay a higher price. 
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The coefficients for the feedback score are positive and significant as expected. 
While the effect of a negative feedback rating is negative, this result might occur due to 
the high inflation in the percentage of negative feedback that some previous studies have 
found. Duration of auction has a negative sign and is significant. This negative effect may 
result because bidders are not patient and are willing to pay less to wait for a long-term 
auction to end. The starting price has a positive effect on the auction price. As mentioned 
previously, the starting price can be considered as a reserve price. Hence, when the reserve 
price is high, the auction ends with a higher price, though there is also the chance that the 
item does not sell. The results here show that, in general, sellers can sell at a higher price. 
Even when I ran different specifications placing conditions on the ability to sell, the starting 
price remains significant. These specifications are not reported here.  
In conclusion, the primary result shows that buyers react positively to the amount 
of information provided. As mentioned previously, a seller with a high-quality item has an 
incentive to reveal its quality by providing a large amount of information. On the other 
hand, a seller with a low-quality item would describe it more generally by providing 
minimal information. Thus, the result here confirms Hypothesis One that the number of 
photos correlates with the auction price.  
1.5.2. Information Disclosure and Level of Uncertainty  
While the results in the previous section show that the amount of information 
provided correlates with the auction price, here, I investigate the hypothesis that the return 
on information disclosure varies with the level of uncertainty. Table 1.3 shows the 
summary statistics for each level of uncertainty, organized from a high to a low level. The 
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first noteworthy aspect is that as the level of uncertainty decreases as the amount of 
information decreases. For example, on average, Used and Seller Refurbished iPhones 
include five photos. In cases of the lower levels of uncertainty, Manufacturer Refurbished 
and NewOther, sellers post on average four photos. For New items, which are the level of 
least uncertainty, sellers, on average, use approximately three photos. The length of the 
text, a second measurement of the amount of information, follows the same pattern as the 
number of photos. As the level of uncertainty decreases, the size of the text disclosed also 
decreases.  
The expectation is that as the level of uncertainty increases, the return on 
information disclosure also increases. To test this hypothesis, I partitioned the full sample 
into six levels of uncertainty. Then I re-estimated Equation (1.1) for each for these levels, 
with Table 1.4 reporting the results for each. The coefficients for the number of photos are 
positive and significant only for the case of the Used and Seller Refurbished conditions. 
On the other hand, the coefficients for text size in terms of file size are significant only for 
the cases Manufacturer Refurbished and NewOther. However, the effect of file size for the 
Manufacturer Refurbished is the weaker of two because the item has been restored to 
working order by the manufacturer. As this restoration offers a guarantee to buyers about 
its condition, the value of the file size in the Manufacturer Refurbished category is less 
than that of NewOther.  
In the case of the lowest level of uncertainty, New iPhone, only the coefficients for 
text size—in terms of the number of words—are positive and slightly significant. Buyers 
value the description in terms of the number of words over other measures of information 
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because with this low level of uncertainty, photos are not effective in showing the actual 
quality of the item. Rather, explaining the condition of the item in words may help buyers 
to update their beliefs about its quality; this explanation may include, for example, 
describing the reason for selling a new item, explaining whether the item has a warranty, 
or whether it is tied to a specific contract, among others.   
Interestingly, the same result applies to items with the highest level of uncertainty, 
For Parts or Not Working. In these cases, buyers also value the description in terms of the 
number of words over photos. These two attributes include defective iPhones, those 
missing some parts or otherwise not functional, and iCloud-locked phones. With this wide 
range of variations in the item’s condition, only a description in words can address the 
quality and help buyers update their beliefs.   
In most cases, the results show that with an increase in the level of uncertainty, the 
value of information disclosure increases. The results also show that not only does the 
amount of information matter so too does the type (the number of photos, file size, and the 
number of words) used to disclose an item’s quality. When the level of uncertainty is either 
extremely high or low, text size is critical in reducing the asymmetric information problem, 
while when the level of uncertainty is in the middle of the range, the number of photos is 
more effective in revealing the quality of the item. 
1.5.3. Information Disclosure and Other Quality Assurance Mechanisms 
In this section, I empirically examine the effect of information disclosure when 
another quality assurance mechanism, either certification or offering the option to return, 
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is considered. The expectation is that the information disclosure premium declines when 
the seller uses alternative quality signals. 
1.5.3.1. Information Disclosure and TRP 
TRP certification, a quality-assurance mechanism awarded by eBay to high-
performance sellers, reduces information asymmetry because it signals the quality of the 
seller. As the expectation is that the TRP badge acts as a substitute for information 
disclosure, it should reduce the effect of information disclosure. However, Table 1.5 shows 
that the amount of information provided by TRP sellers is more than non-TRP sellers. For 
example, TRP sellers post on average 5.88 photos while non-TRP post only 5. The same 
pattern for text size in terms of file size and number of words.  
To investigate the effect of information disclosure when such certification is in 
place, I use a regression similar to the one seen in Table 1.2 but add TRP as a dummy 
variable, measured as one if the seller has an TRP badge and zero otherwise. I also add 
interaction terms for TRP and the amount of information disclosure, the number of photos, 
and text size in terms of file size and number of words. Column (1) in Table 1. 6 shows 
that the effect of Photo on price in the case of an TRP seller is lower than for a non-TRP 
seller. More specifically, the effect of Photo for the TRP seller is negative: when this seller 
adds one more photo, the price decreases by 1.27 percent. As Column (2) shows, the effect 
of information disclosure in terms of photo and file size in the case of TRP sellers is also 
negative, and the results reported in the last column, which show the effect of number of 
words rather than file size, is the same as for the previous two columns: for TRP sellers, 
disclosing more information reduces the auction price.  
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This result contradicts the prediction of the initial model, according to which sellers 
disclose favorable information to mitigate the asymmetric information problem in the 
online market, and buyers interpret the amount of information provided as a signal of 
quality. The result found in this study suggests that the return on the disclosure of iPhones 
in the same condition, unlocked status, and memory size varies from being positive in the 
case of non-TRP sellers to being negative in case of TRP sellers. This finding may be 
because the TRP sellers reveal undesirable aspects of the items listed on the webpage, such 
as their being damaged or defective.  
The question becomes why would TRP sellers reveal unfavorable information? 
Why would they not choose to remain silent as the model predicts? The reason is that TRP 
sellers value long-term profit more than they do short-term gain as a result of 
misrepresenting items. The TRP badge signals the quality of the item, reducing the effect 
of information asymmetry. However, reducing information asymmetry is not the only 
benefit of having a TRP badge; a seller with such a certificate also enjoys lower listing fees 
and a higher ranking in search results, both of which lead to higher profits. On the other 
hand, having a TRP badge requires sellers to have a strong reputation, something that 
requires time to be developed; in addition, their volume of trade must meet a certain 
threshold. These requirements involve a serious investment and a long-term commitment. 
If TRP sellers misrepresent the condition of their items, they put themselves at risk of losing 
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their badge.10 Hence, they disclose accurate information about the item even though this 
information is unfavorable.  
Another explanation is provided by Tadelis and Zettelmeyer (2015), who argue that 
in a setting in which there are simultaneous auctions for heterogeneous goods and there are 
heterogeneous bidders, disclosing information, whether good or bad, about the quality of 
the item helps bidders to choose which auction to participate in, leading to higher profits. 
Thus, information disclosure not only mitigates the information asymmetry problem but 
also helps to match buyers and sellers, resulting in improved market outcomes. This result 
holds whether the information is favorable or unfavorable because bidders’ value the level 
of quality differently; they would choose to bid on items with a quality level that matches 
their quality preferences. 
1.5.3.2. Information Disclosure and Return  
Return is another quality assurance mechanism that non-TRP sellers can use to 
reduce the problem of information asymmetry. Return is a common practice in 
marketplaces when buyers are uncertain about the valuation of the goods ex-ante, and the 
value is revealed only after purchase. On eBay, non-TRP sellers who choose to offer a 
return policy can select from various options that differ in terms of the period allowed for 
returns, restocking fees, and the shipping cost of the return. Table 1.7 shows the summary 
statistics for auctions where return option is offered and when it is not. It is clear that when 
 
10 To be awarded the TRP certificate, sellers must score at least 4.8 points out of 5 in the accuracy of their 
descriptions of the items they list. 
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the return option if offered by seller the amount of information is higher than when the 
return option is not offered.  
To investigate the effect of information disclosure when sellers offer buyers a return 
option, I again used a regression similar to the one seen in Table 1.2, but with the 
modification that in the first specification, I add Return as a dummy variable, equaling one 
if the seller offers a return and zero otherwise. I also include an interaction term between 
Return and Photo. The results in the first column of Table 1.8 show that the effect of Photo 
is negative in cases where the seller offers a return. However, the coefficients for Return 
and the interaction term (Return X Photo) are insignificant. In Column (2), file size is added 
as another measurement of the amount of information provided in addition to the 
interaction term (Return X Log file size) also is included. The coefficients for this 
information (Photo and file size) and their interaction terms with Return are insignificant. 
In the last column the number of words rather than file size is used as a measurement of 
text size, and the interaction terms between the number of words and Return are included, 
with the result being the same as for the first two specifications.  
These results suggest that offering a return does not impact the value of information 
disclosure in the iPhone 6 market. Therefore, offering a return is not a substitute for 
information disclosure, perhaps because of how buyers value a return policy. Buyers may 
be uncertain as to whether they will be reimbursed, especially because most sellers in the 
dataset are individuals who do not have a long history of selling on eBay. Another reason 
that might lead to this result is the complexity involved in using the return policy. To return 
an item, buyers need to contact the seller to issue a return authorization, then repackage the 
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item and ship it; the seller receives the item, re-evaluates its condition, and issues a 
refund—minus restocking fees in some cases. This lengthy process is in addition to buyers 
possibly needing to pay for return shipping and sellers possibly charging restocking fees. 
Hence, completing the process of returning an item is costly and time-consuming, meaning 
the premium on information disclosure is not reduced with the inclusion of a return policy.  
1.6. Conclusion 
Online auction sites such as eBay experience an information asymmetric problem, 
which the marketplace mitigates using various mechanisms. One of the tools used, 
information disclosure, is investigated using data from auctions of iPhone 6 on eBay, 
specifically exploring its effect on price. The primary results confirm the hypothesis that 
sellers with high quality items provide more information and buyers react to this 
information, updating their prior beliefs about the quality and increasing their bids. They 
also show that the condition of the items impacts which type of measurement of the size 
of information (number of photos, text size) is more effective. These results suggest that 
information disclosure is a good mechanism for sellers to use to provide an efficient 
solution to information asymmetric problem. 
In the second part of this paper, I investigate whether a return policy or seller 
certification as substitutes for information can mitigate uncertainty about the quality of an 
item. The results show that sellers with Top Rated Plus badges have a positive and 
significant impact on the prices of items sold, while return policies are not significant. 
Thus, based on the results from this study, when the sellers are certified as Top Rated 
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Plus, they may not solely rely on information disclosure as a signal quality and disclose 
unfavorable information. 
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Figures  
 
Figure 1.1: Information on the auction webpage 
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Figure 1.2: Seller’s Description  
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Figure 1.3: Seller’s photos of iPhone  
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Tables  
   Table 1.1—Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Auction Characteristics           
Final Price 37568 149.07 61.29 0.1 500 
Starting Price  32985 82.52 60.43 0.01 407.99 
Reserve 37568 0.026 0.196 0 2 
Sold (0/1) 37568 0.904 0.295 0 1 
Relist (0/1) 37568 0.125 0.331 0 1 
Return (0/1) 37568 0.187 0.39 0 1 
No. of Bidders 35303 6.306 4.60 0 35 
No. of Bids 37568 14.13 13.83 0 119 
Feedback Score of Highest 
Bidder  
31428 519.86 1948.51 -3 39099 
End on Sunday (0/1) 37568 0.192 0.39 0 1 
Auction Duration (# of Days) 35303 5.76 2.06 1 10 
      
No. of Photos 37568 5.08 2.92 1 12 
File Size (byte) 37497 5607.28 17916.7 1019 401968 
No. of Words 37497 132.18 429.07 0 6970 
 
 
Seller Characteristics  
         
Seller's Feedback Score 37568 3290.07 19727.94 -4 573771 
Seller % of Positive Feedback 34967 98.81 4.71 16.7 100 
Seller % of Negative Feedback 34967 1.19 4.71 0 83.3 
Top Rated Plus (0/1) 37568 0.036 0.19 0 1 
Dealer (0/1)  37568 0.327 0.47 0 1 
Store (0/1) 37568 0.134 0.34 0 1 
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Table 1.2- Hedonic Regressions 
                                                                                    Log price 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  
   
Number of Photos 0.00401** 0.00378* 0.00394* 
  (0.00205) (0.00215) (0.00209) 
Log Feedback Score 0.00865*** 0.00507 0.00798** 
  (0.00302) (0.00442) (0.00372) 
Percentage of Neg. -0.00417*** -0.00424*** -0.00420*** 
  (0.000997) (0.00101) (0.00101) 
Duration of Auction  -0.00531*** -0.00529*** -0.00520*** 
 (0.00177) (0.00172) (0.00169) 
Log Starting Price 0.0221*** 0.0234*** 0.0222*** 
 (0.00609) (0.00619) (0.00615) 
Log File Size (in bytes) 
 
0.0157 
 
  
 
(0.0121) 
 
Number of Words 
  
1.40e-05 
  
  
(2.88e-05) 
Constant 3.445*** 3.328*** 3.447*** 
  (0.0921) (0.107) (0.0927) 
Observations 30,795 30,735 30,795 
R-squared 0.621 0.622 0.621 
  
   
Condition FE YES YES YES 
Memory   FE YES YES YES 
Unlocked FE YES YES YES 
Week FE YES YES YES 
Estimated standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors are clustered by seller 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.3 - Summary Statistics by Conditions 
 
Obs Final Price No. of 
Photos 
File Size 
(Bytes) 
No. of 
Words 
For Parts or Not Working  8230 76.26 4.81 5,812.96 152.09 
Used 27053 167.79 5.24 5,742.68 130.37 
Seller Ref 728 163.37 5.02 3,889.86 104.52 
Manufacturer Ref  467 181.14 4.34 3,053.9   64.55 
New other 390 200.49 4.39 3,402.72 104.06 
New 700 216.7 3.00 2,668.63   56.97 
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Table 1.4-A - Hedonic Regressions by Conditions--For Parts or Not Working 
                                                                                    Log price 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  
   
No. of Photos 0.01 0.007 0.008 
  (0.008) (0.0086) (0.008) 
Log File Size (in bytes)  0.0804*  
   (0.047)  
Number of Words   0.0003*** 
    (0.0001) 
    
    
Observations 5,391 5,382 5,391 
R-squared 0.189 0.197 0.196 
  
   
Condition FE YES YES YES 
Memory   FE YES YES YES 
Unlocked FE YES YES YES 
Week FE YES YES YES 
Estimated standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors are clustered by seller 
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Table 1.4-B - Hedonic Regressions by Conditions--Used 
                                                                                    Log price 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  
   
No. of Photos 0.002* 0.002** 0.002*  
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
Log File Size (in bytes)  -0.005   
   (0.0115)   
Number of Words   -3.36e-05  
    (2.21e-05)  
     
     
Observations 20,710 20,667 20,710  
R-squared 0.442 0.443 0.442 
  
   
Condition FE YES YES YES 
Memory   FE YES YES YES 
Unlocked FE YES YES YES 
Week FE YES YES YES 
Estimated standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors are clustered by seller 
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Table 1.4-C - Hedonic Regressions by Conditions--Seller Refurbished 
                                                                                    Log price 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  
   
No. of Photos 0.006** 0.0065** 0.007**  
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  
Log File Size (in bytes)  -0.006   
   (0.013)   
Number of Words   -4.65e-05  
    (7.41e-05)  
     
     
Observations 529 529 529  
R-squared 0.655 0.655 0.655 
  
   
Condition FE YES YES YES 
Memory   FE YES YES YES 
Unlocked FE YES YES YES 
Week FE YES YES YES 
Estimated standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors are clustered by seller 
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Table 1.4-D - Hedonic Regressions by Conditions--Manufacturer Refurbished 
                                                                                    Log price 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  
   
No. of Photos 0.002 -8.35e-05 0.0004  
  (0.004) (0.00374) (0.004)  
Log File Size (in bytes)  0.0554***   
   (0.0194)   
Number of Words   0.0001  
    (0.0001)  
     
     
Observations 310 310 310  
R-squared 0.654 0.663 0.656 
     
Condition FE YES YES YES 
Memory   FE YES YES YES 
Unlocked FE YES YES YES 
Week FE YES YES YES 
Estimated standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors are clustered by seller 
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Table 1.4-E - Hedonic Regressions by Conditions--NewOther 
Log price 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  
   
No. of Photos 0.006 0.005 0.005  
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  
Log File Size (in bytes)  0.063**   
   (0.025)   
Number of Words   0.0001  
    (0.0002)  
     
     
Observations 257 251 257  
R-squared 0.678 0.689 0.680 
     
Condition FE YES YES YES 
Memory   FE YES YES YES 
Unlocked FE YES YES YES 
Week FE YES YES YES 
Estimated standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors are clustered by seller 
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Table 1.4-F- Hedonic Regressions by Conditions--New 
                                                                                    Log price 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  
   
No. of Photos -0.0002 -6.86e-05 -0.001  
  (0.006) (0.00555) (0.005)  
Log File Size (in bytes)  0.0155   
   (0.0133)   
Number of Words   0.0001*  
    (8.34e-05)  
     
     
Observations 443 443 443  
R-squared 0.514 0.515 0.516 
     
Condition FE YES YES YES 
Memory   FE YES YES YES 
Unlocked FE YES YES YES 
Week FE YES YES YES 
Estimated standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors are clustered by seller 
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Table 1.5 - Summary Statistics by TRP 
 Obs Final Price No. of 
Photos 
File Size 
(Bytes) 
No. of 
Words 
Sold Buyer’s 
Feedback 
Non-TRP 36,208 149.50 5.05   5,342.02 124.72 0.90 527.04 
TRP  1,360 137.63 5.88 12,660.82  330.25 0.92 328.8 
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Table 1.6 - Information Disclosure and TRP  
                                                                                    Log price 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  
   
Number of Photos 0.00486** 0.00456** 0.00476** 
  (0.00204) (0.00215) (0.00208) 
TRP 0.141 0.805** 0.221** 
 (0.0985) (0.332) (0.101) 
TRP X Photo  -0.0176* -0.0205** -0.0147 
 (0.0104) (0.0101) (0.00913) 
Log Feedback 0.00757*** 0.00341 0.00656** 
  (0.00262) (0.00370) (0.00309) 
Negative feedback -0.00426*** -0.00432*** -0.00429*** 
  (0.000988) (0.000994) (0.000992) 
Auction Duration -0.00579*** -0.00540*** -0.00533*** 
 (0.00174) (0.00171) (0.00168) 
Log Starting Price 0.0231*** 0.0256*** 0.0256*** 
 (0.00574) (0.00528) (0.00558) 
Log Text Size ( in bytes) 
 
0.0201* 
 
  
 
(0.0118) 
 
TRP X Log Text Size ( in bytes)  -0.0710*  
  (0.0376)  
Number of Words 
  
3.24e-05 
  
  
(2.94e-05) 
TRP X Number of Words   -0.000307*** 
   (9.34e-05) 
Constant 3.481*** 3.324*** 3.479*** 
  (0.117) (0.133) (0.117) 
  
   
Observations 30,795 30,735 30,795 
R-squared 0.627 0.628 0.628 
  
   
Condition FE YES YES YES 
Memory FE YES YES YES 
Unlocked FE YES YES YES 
Week FE YES YES YES 
Estimated standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Standard errors are clustered by seller 
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Table 1.7- Summary Statistics by Return 
 Obs Final Price No. of 
Photos 
File Size 
(Bytes) 
No. of 
Words 
Sold Buyer’s 
Feedback 
No-Return  30,556 150.61 4.98   2,329.27 70.65 0.90 532.18 
Return  5,652 143.52 5.41 21,823.44 420.544 0.93 496.97 
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Table 1.8 - Information Disclosure and Return  
                                                                                    Log price 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  
   
Number of Photos 0.00708*** 0.00734*** 0.00652*** 
  (0.00123) (0.00121) (0.00121) 
Return 0.124 -0.103 0.125* 
 (0.0756) (0.117) (0.0750) 
Return X Photo  -0.0113 -0.0120 -0.0107 
 (0.00888) (0.00936) (0.00893) 
Log Feedback 0.00344 0.000298 0.00220 
  (0.00355) (0.00401) (0.00355) 
Negative Feedback -0.00421*** -0.00427*** -0.00423*** 
  (0.000991) (0.000990) (0.000994) 
Auction Duration -0.00545*** -0.00503*** -0.00544*** 
 (0.00183) (0.00173) (0.00179) 
Log Starting Price 0.0303*** 0.0324*** 0.0306*** 
 (0.00491) (0.00456) (0.00490) 
Log Text Size ( in bytes) 
 
-2.43e-05 
 
  
 
(0.0135) 
 
Return X Log Text Size ( in bytes)  0.0274  
  (0.0195)  
Number of Words 
  
8.11e-05 
  
  
(5.14e-05) 
Return X Number of Words   -6.99e-05 
   (5.50e-05) 
Constant 3.396*** 3.402*** 3.400*** 
  (0.0898) (0.132) (0.0900) 
  
   
Observations 29,566 29,507 29,566 
R-squared 0.630 0.631 0.630 
  
   
Condition FE YES YES YES 
Memory FE YES YES YES 
Unlocked FE YES YES YES 
Week FE YES YES YES 
Estimated standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Standard errors are clustered by seller 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
The Role of Bidder Experience in Evaluating Online Seller Reputation Mechanisms 
 
 
 
 
2.1. Introduction  
Asymmetric information can potentially cause market inefficiencies or market 
failure (Akerlof, 1970). At online marketplaces like eBay and Amazon, buyers engage in 
transactions with anonymous sellers without the opportunity to inspect their purchases in 
person. As a result, such marketplaces experience an asymmetric information problem. To 
mitigate this problem and establish trust between anonymous trade partners, these 
marketplaces have adopted a feedback system,11 using the information posted by buyers to 
generate a variety of measures of seller reputation. A much empirical literature has 
investigated the effect of seller reputation measures on buyer behavior. In general, the 
empirical results show that the seller’s reputation has a positive effect on the buyers’ 
willingness to pay.12 
Most of these previous studies have assumed that all bidders are equally able to 
evaluate the reputation measures in a similar manner. However, bidders on eBay vary in 
their level of experience: some who frequently purchase from sellers on eBay may have 
extensive knowledge of its feedback system and rules, while others who buy only 
 
11 The feedback system was first developed by eBay. Other online marketplaces adopted similar systems as 
a mechanism to reduce the problem of asymmetric information. In addition to reputation, online marketplaces 
use other mechanisms, including warranty, certification and information disclosure.  
12 Cabral (2012) and Tadelis (2016) provide a survey of recent literature on reputation mechanisms in online 
marketplaces. 
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occasionally or are first-time buyers may not be familiar with this system. Thus, the 
assumption that all buyers value the seller’s reputation uniformly might not give an 
accurate measure of the effect of the seller’s reputation measure on the buyers’ behavior. 
In other words, to accurately determine the effect of reputation, one should consider the 
reputation measures as a function of bidder experience. 
In this paper, I investigate the role of bidder experience in evaluating sellers’ 
reputation measures on eBay. More specifically, I explore the following two questions: 
 Does the seller’s reputation measure have the same effect on all buyers’ 
behavior?  
 Is there a specific measure of reputation that is more useful for experienced 
bidders for evaluating sellers’ reputation and a different one for inexperienced bidders?  
To address these questions, I use data from eBay on iPhone 6 auctions. This dataset 
consists of item, auction, and seller characteristics. In addition, eBay’s feedback system 
generates various measures of a seller’s reputation that vary in their complexity: some are 
easy to interpret, while others require some knowledge on the part of buyers to be able to 
interpret them. The primary focus of this study is on two of these measures: the feedback 
score and the Top Rated Plus (TRP) badge.13 The overall feedback score will be measured 
as the difference between the positive and negative feedback scores. Top Rated Plus is a 
badge awarded to high-performing sellers located next to the seller’s identity (ID) on the 
listing page, making it is easy for bidders to notice and understand. To measure the bidders’ 
 
13 There are other measures of reputation that eBay offers, but those measures are not effective as I will 
explain in Section 2.  
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experience, I use the bidders’ feedback score as a proxy for experience because since sellers 
on eBay are allowed to leave only positive feedback about buyers, their feedback score is 
correlated with the total number of transactions.  
The primary finding from this paper is that bidders’ evaluation of sellers’ reputation 
measures vary with a bidder’s level of experience. Moreover, this study shows that bidders’ 
experience plays a role in their determining which of the sellers’ reputation measures are 
more useful compared to others. In addition, inexperienced bidders value sellers’ reputation 
measures in terms of the TRP to a greater extent than do experienced bidders, while 
experienced bidders value the feedback score more than inexperienced bidders. I argue 
here that this result is due to the limited knowledge inexperienced bidders have about 
eBay’s feedback system: they are unable to infer sellers’ reputations from the more 
complex a measure like feedback score, leaving them to use the easier to recognize and 
interpret measures of reputation, such as a TRP badge, to help them determine the value of 
a seller’s reputation. On the other hand, experienced bidders are able to use their knowledge 
and experience of the feedback system; thus, they place more value on the feedback score 
as a measure of a seller’s reputation. 
This paper contributes to the growing literature on the role of reputation in reducing 
the issue of asymmetric information in online marketplaces (e.g., Melnik and Alm 
2002,2005; McDonald and Slawson 2002;Lucking-Reiley et al. 2007). Like most of these 
studies, this paper confirms Shapiro’s finding (1983) that a seller’s reputation has a positive 
impact on the price of the item for sale. However, the main contribution of this study is its 
finding that bidder experience plays an important role in evaluating sellers’ reputation 
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measures. I am aware of only one other paper that also studies the effect of bidder 
experience on evaluating a seller’s reputation, the study conducted by Livingston (2010). 
His results show that only experienced bidders value the seller’s feedback score and that 
they increase their bids for sellers with higher feedback scores. Conversely, inexperienced 
bidders do not value the seller’s feedback score and bid the same amount regardless of this 
score. My finding confirms Livingston’s (2010) research; however, I extend his study by 
including another measure of seller reputation, the TRP badge. I show that the bidder’s 
experience not only plays a role in evaluating reputation measures but also determines 
which of these measures plays a more important role: my results indicate that the seller’s 
feedback score is more important to experienced bidders, while inexperienced bidders 
prefer a measure of reputation, such as a TRP badge, that is a simple and easy to understand.  
Similarly, using internal eBay data, Nosko and Tadelis (2015) show that buyers 
who have had bad experiences do not return to eBay, causing a negative externality on the 
entire platform. They point out the difficulties that some buyers, especially inexperienced 
ones, face in interpreting the measures of seller reputation, which might lead these buyers 
to deal with sellers with bad reputations. My findings show that a TRP badge, which is a 
simple and easy to understand measure of a seller’s reputation, helps especially 
inexperienced bidders find quality sellers, thus perhaps decreasing the chance of negative 
externality. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data, while 
Section 3 discusses the theoretical framework; Section 4 continues by presenting the 
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empirical model and estimated results, followed by Section 5, which discusses the results 
and draws conclusions. 
2.2. Data  
I collected data from eBay using an R script program to search for completed 
iPhone 6 auctions. After downloading the listing page, bidding history, and seller’s profile, 
the program scrapes the pages to extract the variables of interest, for this study item 
characteristics, auction characteristics, and sellers’ characteristics. Figure 2.1 shows the 
listing page and Figure 2.4 shows the bid history where the highest bidder is on the top of 
the list. The focus of this paper is on the bidder’s behavior in relation to sellers’ reputation 
measures on eBay. Since its launch in 1995, eBay has used a feedback system to reduce 
the information asymmetry between buyers and sellers on its platform. The feedback 
system is based on feedback posted by buyers and sellers. In this system the buyer can rate 
the seller by leaving a positive (+1), neutral (0), or negative (-1) feedback score with a short 
comment and a more detailed rating if they chose. On the other hand, sellers can only leave 
positive feedback about the buyer.14  
The system generates several reputation measures. The feedback score, the 
difference between the number of positive and negative scores, is displayed on the listing 
page next to the seller ID (Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2) and can also be found on the seller’s 
profile (Figure 2.3). While the feedback score shows performance based on the user’s entire 
history, the percentage of positive feedback shows the user’s recent performance on eBay, 
 
14 To improve the feedback system and reduce the retaliation by sellers, in 2008 eBay changed its feedback 
system so that the seller is only allowed to leave the buyer a positive feedback score. 
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calculated based on feedback scores over the last 12 months; it is the number of positive 
feedback scores is divided by the total number of feedback (the sum of positive, negative 
and neutral scores).  
Another measure of sellers’ reputation is detailed seller ratings (DSRs). Unlike the 
feedback score, DSRs allow buyers to rate sellers anonymously by leaving a score from 
one to five for each of these categories: item as described, communication, shipping and 
handling, and shipping charges. The average rates for each of these categories over the past 
12 months are displayed only on the seller’s profile (Figure 2.3).  
eBay awards high-quality sellers with a reputation badge, Top Rated Plus. To 
qualify, a seller must meet the following requirements: at least 100 transactions, $1,000 in 
sales in the prior year, a low dispute rate, a low rate of cases closed without seller 
resolution, a low rate of late shipment, the same or one business day handling time and free 
returns. The Top-Rated Plus badge appears on the listing page next to the seller ID (Figure 
2.1), making it easy for buyers to distinguish these sellers from those without this 
distinction.  
In each listing, eBay displays the seller’s feedback score, the percentage of positive 
feedback, and the Top-Rated Plus badge if the seller has one. In this paper, I exclude 
measures like DSRs that appear on the seller’s profile but not on the listing page because 
according to Nosko and Tadelis (2015), who use internal data from more than two million 
eBay sellers, fewer than 1% of buyers access sellers’ profiles. Hui et al. (2018), who also 
used internal data from eBay, report a similar finding. Because DRSs are used by only a 
small number of buyers as a measure of seller’s reputation, I exclude them from this 
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analysis. Moreover, Nosko and Tadelis (2015) also report that the average percentage of 
positive feedback among two million sellers is 99.3%, with a median of 100%. Thus, I also 
exclude percentage of positive feedback from this study. As a result, this study is limited 
to two measures of reputation, feedback scores and Top Rated Plus badge.  
To explore the role of the bidders’ experience in valuing the sellers’ reputation, I 
use the feedback score as a proxy for experience on eBay15 because sellers on eBay can 
leave only positive feedback on buyers. Thus, using this score provides a rough estimate 
of the number of transactions for a bidder eBay. However, this proxy is not completely 
accurate for several reasons: not all transactions end with the seller leaving feedback; the 
feedback score does not reflect the experience the bidders gain from participating in 
auctions that they did not win; and the bidders may have previous experience on eBay 
under a different account ID. These reasons may mean the experience could be 
underestimated.  
The variables used in this paper are summarized in Table 2.1. I define the final price 
as the sum of the winning bid and the shipping cost. The average price in this dataset is 
$149.11, and the starting price (starting bid plus shipping cost) has a mean of $82. One can 
think of the starting price as a type of reserve price, meaning that a higher starting price 
might decrease the chance of the item being sold. Approximately 90% of iPhone 6 auctions 
in my dataset were successful. Another variable that might affect the outcome of an auction 
 
15 Garratt,Walker and Wooders  (2012) , Wilcox(2000)  and Livingston (2010) are examples of studies that 
also use feedback score as a proxy for the buyer experience. 
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is its duration; thus, I included the variable auction length. On average, the duration of an 
auction is approximately five days. 
The primary focus of this paper is on the role of bidder experience in evaluating 
various measures of reputation. As previously mentioned, the bidder’s feedback score is 
used as a measure for bidder experience on eBay. Bidders’ experience in the dataset ranges 
from 0 (no experience) to 39,009, with an average of 517.28 feedback responses. I use two 
measures of seller reputation: the feedback score and the Top Rated Plus status. In the 
dataset, sellers’ feedback scores range from 0 to 573,771 with a mean of 3,294.98. 
According to Livingston (2005), the feedback score has diminishing returns. The values of 
early feedback scores are different from the later ones. To account for these diminishing 
returns, I classified auctions based on seller feedback scores into four quartiles.  Then, I 
created dummy variables for each of these groups. The other measure of reputation is the 
Top Rated Plus badge. In the dataset, approximately 1,360 of the auctions are listed by Top 
Rated Plus sellers or approximately 3.63% of our sample.  
Table 2.2.A indicates that as on average as bidders’ experience increases, they 
choose to trade with sellers with higher feedback scores. In other word, as sellers’ feedback 
scores increase, these sellers attract more experienced bidders. On the other hand, TRP 
sellers attract inexperienced bidders as shown in Table 2.2.B.  
2.3. Theoretical framework  
In his seminal work, Akerlof (1970) shows that buyers’ uncertainty about product 
quality causes asymmetric information, which might cause market failure. More recently, 
Klein and Leffler (1981) show that the reputation mechanism can be used to mitigate this 
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problem of asymmetric information. They model a reputation mechanism based on an 
infinite repeated game where a buyer and a seller interact with each other repeatedly. In 
such a game, there is an equilibrium where the seller sells high-quality goods in every 
period and does not cheat even though cheating by selling lower-quality goods is in the 
seller’s best interest in the short run (Cabral, 2012; Tadelis, 2016). 
Any deviation from this equilibrium by the seller would cause the buyer to stop 
interacting with him in the future, and this loss of business would reduce the seller’s future 
profits. If the seller values the future highly enough (i.e., if the future expected payoff is 
high), then the gain from future transactions exceeds the gain from cheating today; thus, 
the seller avoids cheating and continues to sell high-quality goods (Cabral, 2012; Tadelis, 
2016). As a result, the seller is given an incentive to act honestly since a good reputation is 
rewarded by buyers who bid higher in this situation (Shapiro, 1983).  
The reputation mechanism works even in cases where the seller interacts with 
multiple buyers if the seller’s previous performance is made available to these potential 
customers (Tadelis, 2016). If the seller deviates from the equilibrium by cheating (selling 
low-quality goods) and prospective buyers are able to monitor the seller’s action, then they 
will stop interacting with this seller. The seller, therefore, has an incentive to act honestly 
when dealing with current buyer, knowing that prospective buyers will reward this honest 
behavior and punish bad behavior.  
eBay has adopted reputation mechanism as a tool to reduce uncertainty about the 
quality of a trade and to promote trust between the buyer and seller. The feedback system 
allows trade partners to leave a feedback. The company then uses the ratings from previous 
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trade partners to generate several reputation measures and make them publicly available to 
potential buyers: feedback score, percent positive, detailed seller ratings, and Top Rated 
Plus status. Prospective buyers potentially use the seller’s rating to evaluate the latter’s 
reputation. The reputation model predicts that buyers reward sellers with high reputations 
by bidding higher on items offered by them. Empirical studies on the effect of eBay’s 
feedback on the selling price generally show that a high seller reputation increases price. 
The assumption of most previous studies is that bidders are able to understand seller 
reputation measures and to evaluate them consistently.  
However, inexperienced buyers have limited knowledge about eBay and its 
feedback system and rules while experienced buyers are more familiar. Thus, due to their 
different levels of experience, these two types of buyers may understand the value of 
reputation measures differently. For example, experienced buyers who are familiar with 
eBay’s feedback system may be able to use feedback scores, to evaluate the seller’s quality. 
However, inexperienced buyers may be more sensitive to the risk of using the feedback 
score, assuming that it does not help in determining the quality of the seller. Conversely, a 
simple and easy-to-understand measure of reputation like Top Rated Plus might be more 
helpful to them in evaluating a seller’s reputation. Therefore, the assumption made by most 
previous studies does not give an accurate assessment of the effect of a measure of a seller’s 
reputation on bidder behavior. 
Thus, in this study I relax this assumption and argue that buyer experience plays an 
important role in the evaluation of the different measurements of seller reputation, 
specifically feedback score and Top Rated Plus status. Furthermore, the inexperienced 
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bidders value Top Rated Plus status more highly than experienced bidders, while on the 
other hand, experienced bidders value feedback score more highly. 
2.4. Empirical model and estimation results  
In this study, I use data from eBay on iPhone 6 auctions to analyze the role of 
bidders’ experience in evaluating sellers’ reputation measures. Based on the previous 
literature on eBay, I employ the following model:  
log 𝑝 𝛽  𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑄 𝛽  𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟 experience𝑄 𝑇𝑅𝑃 
𝛽 ,  𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑄 ∗ 𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟 experience𝑄  
𝛽  𝑇𝑅𝑃 ∗  𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑄  𝛽  𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠
𝜀   2.1  
The dependent variable (Pi) is the auction price, the sum of the winning bid and the 
shipping cost.16 I control for factors that might affect the price: the duration of the auction, 
the starting price, and the auction date. I also use iPhone-fixed effects: memory size, 
condition, and if the phone is locked to specific carrier. As there is a potential correlation 
between the seller’s reputation and disclosure skills, I control for the amount of information 
disclosed. In addition, εi is the error term, and the assumption is that it is uncorrelated with 
the independent variables. 
 
16 The auctions on eBay are second price auctions where the winner pays the second highest bid plus a small 
increment.  
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The main independent variables in this model are reputation measures, the feedback 
score and Top Rated Plus status. In the dataset, the sellers’ feedback scores range from 0 
to 57,3771. Based on Livingston (2005), who asserts that the relationship between price 
and feedback scores is nonlinear, I classified auctions based on feedback scores into four 
quartiles and created dummy variables as indicators for each of these groups. As indicated 
earlier, TRP, another measure of seller reputation, is awarded by eBay to sellers based on 
their ratings and the size of their trade. As it appears next to the seller’s ID on the listing 
page, it is easy to notice and to interpret, and it does not require much experience with the 
feedback system to determine its value. In this model, TRP is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if the seller has a TRP badge and 0 otherwise. To explore the role of bidders’ experience 
in evaluating sellers’ reputation measures, I use bidder’s feedback score as a proxy for 
bidder experience as I explained in Section 2. I also divided bidders based on their feedback 
scores into quartiles and created dummy variables as indicators for each.   
I also include interaction terms between the sellers’ feedback score quartiles and 
the bidders’ experience quartiles as well as interaction terms between TRR and bidder 
experience quartiles. These interaction terms make it possible to examine the role of bidder 
experience in evaluating feedback score quartiles and TRP status. In this model, the 
expectation is that, in general, bidders react positively to both of these measures of seller 
reputation and bid more for items being sold by sellers with a higher reputation. However, 
the evaluation of sellers’ reputation measures varies with bidders’ experience. The 
evaluation levels should be reflected in the bidder’s willingness to bid. Since experienced 
bidders have knowledge of eBay’s feedback system, one would expect them to value the 
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feedback score more; thus bid higher for the seller with higher feedback score, while 
inexperienced bidders value the TRP badge more; therefore bid higher for TRP.  
I estimated Equation 2.1 in which I included both measures of reputation, the 
feedback score (Q 2, Q 3, and Q 4) and TRP status (a dummy). Column (3) in Table 2.3 
reports the coefficient estimates.17 Inexperienced buyers do not appear to value seller 
feedback and even bid slightly less for sellers with very high feedback scores.  
In contrast, the interaction terms between the sellers’ feedback scores and the 
bidders’ experience indicate that bidders in Q2, Q3, and Q4 react positively to a seller’s 
feedback score. The willingness to bid of each group of these bidders increases as sellers’ 
feedback scores increase. For example, the most experienced bidders (in Q4), bid 4.09% 
higher for sellers in the second quartile than for the sellers in the first quartile. The bid 
increases to 7.96% and 5.7% higher, for sellers in the third and fourth quartiles, 
respectively, than for the sellers in the first quartile.18 
Moreover, the coefficient estimates for these interaction terms are, on average, 
larger and statistically more significant as bidders obtain more experience: bidders in the 
fourth quartile value the sellers’ feedback scores more than bidders in the third quartile, 
while bidders in the third quartile value sellers’ feedback scores more than bidders in the 
 
17 Table 2.3 also reports the results estimates for Equation (2.1) where only one of the seller’s reputation 
measures is used. Column (1) reports the results for only feedback score quartiles and Column (2) reports the 
results for only TRP. However, I am going to focus only on the specification where both of these measures 
are used. 
18 The bidder’s experience in Qi value seller in Quartile j = coefficient of seller feedback score in Quartile j 
+ coefficient of (seller feedback score Quartile j x Bidder experience Qi)   
For example: the bidder in Q4 value sellers in Quartile 3 by 0.00233 + 0.0743 = 0.07663 which is equal to 
100*(Exp (0.07663)-1) = 7.96% 
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second quartile. These results indicate that as bidders gain more experience, their 
evaluation of sellers’ feedback scores increases and becomes more statistically significant. 
For example, the bidders in Q2 bid 5.26% higher for sellers in the third quartiles than for 
the sellers in the first quartile, while the bidders in Q3 bid 6.78%, and the bidders in Q4 
bid 7.96% higher for sellers in the third quartile than the ones in the first quartile. 
In general, sellers with TRP status receive higher bids than those without this status. 
However, these effects are largest for inexperienced bidders (Q1) who bid approximately 
14% higher for sellers with a TRP badge than for sellers without a TRP badge, while more 
experienced bidders value TRP badges less or to the point of being insignificant. For 
example, bidders in (Q3) bid approximately 3% higher for sellers with a TRP than for 
sellers without TRP status. The coefficient estimates for bidders in (Q2) and (Q4) are 
insignificant. In summary inexperienced bidders (Q1) value TRP higher than experienced 
bidders, but do not value higher levels of seller feedback scores in the same way that more 
experienced buyers do.  
2.5. Discussion  
The empirical finding suggests that the value of the seller’s reputation measures, 
specifically feedback and Top Rated Plus, on eBay vary based on the amount of experience 
of the bidders. The results show that inexperienced bidders value Top Rated Plus, while 
experienced bidders value the feedback score. In the context of the theoretical model 
proposed in this study, this difference suggests that bidders with limited knowledge and 
unfamiliarity with the eBay feedback system have difficulty interpreting the information 
from the feedback score. Presenting a simple and easy to understand measure of reputation 
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like a Top Rated Plus badge makes it easier for these bidders to understand and interpret 
the reputation signal. On the other hand, more experienced bidders can discern the quality 
of the seller using a feedback score. Moreover, the results show that as bidders obtain more 
experience, the value they place on the Top Rated Plus declines, and their value for the 
feedback score increases. As bidders gain more experience, they become more familiar 
with the eBay feedback system and its rules and are able to understand the value of the 
feedback score as a measure of reputation more accurately.  
Nosko and Tadelis (2015) point out that theoretical models of reputation assume 
that the way in which information is presented does not affect the buyers’ behavior.  
According to them, this assertion is empirically unlikely to be supported in practice, 
especially for less experienced buyers. They argue in their study that the difficulty some 
bidders face in interpreting the reputation measures reduces their ability to understand the 
true value of sellers’ reputations and increases the chance that they will interact with low 
quality sellers, perhaps leading to a bad experience that results in their leaving the 
marketplace platform and, as a result, causes negative externalities for the other sellers on 
the platform. In this study, I show that a measure like a TRP badge, which is simple and 
easy to understand, helps inexperienced bidders see the true value of sellers’ reputations 
and increases their chance to find quality sellers and, in turn a good experience, thus 
increasing the likelihood that they will return to the platform and reducing the negative 
externalities. The implication of this study is that the way in which information is presented 
does indeed have an impact on bidder behavior, especially the less experienced ones. This 
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finding suggests that it would be beneficial for online marketplaces to consider user 
experience in presenting the seller’s information. 
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Figures  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Listing Page 
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Figure 2.2: Seller’s reputation measures 
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Figure 2.3: Seller’s profile 
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Figure 2.4: Bid History  
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Tables  
 
   Table 2.1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Auction Characteristics           
Final Price 37,512 149.11 61.27 0.1 500 
Starting Price  32,985 77.54 59.80 0.01 399.99 
Sold (0/1) 37,512 0.90 0.29 0 1 
      
End of Sunday (0/1) 37,512 0.192 0.39 0 1 
Auction Duration (No. of Days) 35,250 5.76 2.06 1 10 
      
Seller Characteristics      
Feedback score 37,512 3294.98 19742.25 0 573771 
Q1 (0-40) 9,469 15.48 12.29 0 40 
Q2 (41-148) 9,302 86.17 30.61 41 148 
Q3 (149-463) 9,366 271.69 85.40 149 463 
Q4 (> 463) 9,375 12811.56 37932.21 464 573771 
Percentage Positive Feedback 34,957 98.82 4.61 16.7 100 
Top Rated Plus (0/1) 37,512 0.036 0.19 0 1 
      
Bidder Characteristics      
Bidder Experience 31,592 517.28 1943.73 0 39099 
Q1 (0-21) 7,956 6.93 6.58 0 21 
Q2 (22-108) 7,869 57.10     24.71 22 108 
Q3 (109-372) 7,871 214.25 74.63 109 372 
Q4 (>373) 7,896 1792.20 3594.54 373 39099 
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                    Table 2.2.A: Bidder Experience vs Seller Reputation 
Bidder Experience 
Seller Feedback 
(mean) 
 
Q1 (1-21) 2399.57  
Q2 (22-108)   2824.47  
Q3 (109-372) 2635.56  
Q4 (> 463) 3930.77  
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                     Table 2.2.B –Bidder Experience vs Top Rated Plus  
Top Rated Plus 
Bidder 
Experience 
(mean) 
 
Non-TRP 524.48  
TRP 326.45  
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Table 2.3- Reputation Reaction by Bidders  
  Log P   Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Seller’s Feedback Score    
41-148 (Quartile 2) 0.00743  0.00839 
 (0.0104)  (0.0104) 
149-463 (Quartile 3) 0.000749  0.00233 
 (0.0150)  (0.0148) 
>463 (Quartile 4) -0.0207  -0.0351** 
 (0.0198)  (0.0178) 
TopRatedPlus (TRP) 0.100 0.133**
(0.0669) (0.0654)
Bidder Experience    
22-108 [Quartile 2] -0.0334*** -0.00647 -0.0333*** 
 (0.00983) (0.00721) (0.00980) 
109-372 [Quartile 3] -0.0302*** 0.00235 -0.0299*** 
 (0.00971) (0.00585) (0.00968) 
>372 [Quartile 4] -0.0378*** 0.00900 -0.0380*** 
  (0.00951) (0.00602) (0.00948) 
Seller Q2 * BidderExp 0.0124  0.0123 
 (0.0142)  (0.0142) 
Seller Q3 * BidderExp 0.0534**  0.0536** 
 (0.0212)  (0.0213) 
Seller Q4 * BidderExp 0.0466***  0.0475** 
 (0.0173)  (0.0174) 
Seller Q2 * BidderExp 0.0191  0.0185 
 (0.0139)  (0.0139) 
Seller Q3 * BidderExp 0.0639***  0.0633*** 
 (0.0146)  (0.0146) 
Seller Q4 * BidderExp 0.0346*  0.0492*** 
 (0.0180)  (0.0180) 
Seller Q2 * BidderExp 0.0321**  0.0317** 
 (0.0134)  (0.0134) 
Seller Q3 * BidderExp 0.0747***  0.0743*** 
 (0.0163)  (0.0164) 
Seller Q4 * BidderExp 0.0819***  0.0905*** 
 (0.0187)  (0.0174) 
TRP * BidderExp Q2  -0.00625 -0.0271 
  (0.0330) (0.0350) 
TRP * BidderExp Q3  - -0.103*** 
  (0.0319) (0.0355) 
TRP * BidderExp Q4  -0.0149 -0.0583 
  (0.0422) (0.0439) 
Observations 31,537 31,537 31,537 
R-squared 0.624 0.623 0.625 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix A 
Money Back Guarantee 
eBay offers a protection policy called “Money Back Guarantee.” This policy acts 
as free insurance. So, in case of buyers do not receive the item they paid for or the item 
they received differs from the seller’s description, buyers can file a claim. Under this 
policy, buyers either get the item they paid for, or they get a full refund. Almost all items 
sold on eBay are covered under this policy, even if sellers do not offer a return.19 The log 
of this policy is placed on the listing page. Figure A.1 shows the policy log. The 
assumption in this paper is that all buyers are aware of this policy. According to Lewis 
(2011), for the information discourse to work as a mechanism to mitigate the information 
asymmetry in the online market, it needs to be enforceable. So, this condition is satisfied 
in case of eBay through this policy. While in case of eBay motors, Lewis (2011) argues 
that the enforceable part is satisfied through either car is picked up by the buyer, or when 
the vehicle is shipped, the payment is held by a third party until the vehicle is delivered. 
I argue that the “Money Back Guarantee” policy makes the enforceable aspect is more 
emphasized here compared to the case of eBay motors. 
  Figure A.1: Money Back Guarantee  
 
 
19 source: https://pages.ebay.com/ebay-money-back-guarantee/ 
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Appendix B 
Endogeneity 
In Section 5.1, the assumption is that the error terms are uncorrelated with the 
number of photos and the text size. Following Lewis (2011), I relax this assumption by 
including the observed number of bidders as a control variable. The results in Table B.1 
shows that the estimated relationship for photos is still positive but smaller and less 
significant than the results seen in Table 1.2. This result confirmed Lewis (2011) findings, 
the content of photos is what cause bidders to increase their bids in auctions that have 
many photos.  
Table B.1- Endogeneity  
                                                                                    Log price 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  
   
Number of Photos 0.00304* 0.00341* 0.00315* 
  (0.00165) (0.00180) (0.00170) 
Log Text Size ( in bytes) 
 
-0.00713 
 
  
 
(0.00884) 
 
Number of Words 
  
-1.32e-05 
  
  
(2.28e-05) 
Constant 3.587*** 3.644*** 3.588*** 
  (0.0760) (0.0947) (0.0760) 
  
   
Observations 30,795 30,735 30,795 
R-squared 0.627 0.627 0.627 
  
   
Condition FE YES YES YES 
Memory FE YES YES YES 
Unlocked FE YES YES YES 
Week FE YES YES YES 
Number of bidders FE YES YES YES 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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